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While the Serrano v Priest decisions and Proposition 13 effectively rendered California
school district budgets exogenous, intra-district resource allocation remains largely at the
discretion of school district administrations.  As a result,  Serrano v Priest and
Proposition 13 alleviate concerns about the potentially endogenous relationship between
student body composition and inter-district resource disparity and allow us to focus on
consistently estimating the effect of classroom versus non-classroom spending.  We find
that teaching expenditures have a positive effect on student performance while non-
teaching expenditures have a negative effect.  Either the reallocation of $100 from
administrative to classroom spending, with no change in overall expenditures, or an $100
increase aimed directly at the classroom moves the average California high school
approximately 5 percentage points higher in the state test score rankings.  These results
are similar across grade levels (elementary, middle and high schools) and subject areas
(mathematics, reading, language, spelling, social studies, and science).  Our results
suggest that both current and future educational expenditures should be targeted towards
the classroom.
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I. Introduction
Hanushek and Rivkin (1997) document the extraordinary rise in American
educational expenditures over the past century that have resulted from falling student-
teacher ratios, rising teacher salaries, and growing non-instructional costs.  Increased
educational spending is the most visible outcome of educational reform during the recent
decades.  For example, the average California school district increased nominal per pupil
expenditures from $4,126 in 1992-93 to $5,436 in 1998-99.
1  Have these additional
expenditures improved student outcomes?
Despite considerable research effort by many individuals, a widely agreed upon
answer has not yet emerged.
2  Looking at school quality and wages, Card and Krueger
(1992) find that men educated in states with higher quality schools earn higher wages
later in life while Betts (1996), Heckman et al. (1996), and Grogger (1996) find no such
impact.  In a similar vein, Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995) find little evidence that
measurable school inputs have an impact on student achievement and Hoxby (1998b)
finds no evidence that smaller classes have a positive effect on test scores.  On the other
hand, Betts (1995), Brewer (1996), Goldhaber and Brewer (1997), Figlio (1997) and Eide
and Showalter (1998) find some evidence that spending on computers, teachers, teacher
qualifications, smaller classes, and school year length respectively, have a positive impact
on student achievement.
Disentangling the relationship between school inputs and student outcomes is
generally complicated by data limitations and endogeneity problems.  While most studies
are interested in all educational inputs, data limitations force the use of proxies such as
                                               
1 See the California Department of Education website, www.cde.ca.gov. These numbers represent the
average per pupil expenditure based on average daily attendance.2
the pupil-teacher ratio or broad aggregates like expenditures per student.  While class size
is an important issue, one would ideally separate its influence from other unmeasured
educational inputs.  One way to get at this issue is to use a simple reduced form including
expenditures per student broken into instructional and non-instructional spending.  In this
way, teacher characteristics such as experience and ability, as measured by higher
salaries, as well as class size are separated from non-instructional, administrative and
maintenance costs.
Critics of public education, including teachers, argue that U.S. schools involve
unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy.  This results in administrative services
receiving too large a share of educational resources.  Brewer (1996) finds weak evidence
that higher administrative allocations lead to lower student performance for a sample of
New York state districts.  Ferguson and Ladd (1996) find that instructional spending is
positively and significantly related to student performance in Alabama.  Using a national
sample of unified school districts, Dee (1998b) finds that increased instructional spending
is associated with higher graduation rates.
The question of why school districts would choose to allocate resources to less
productive inputs remains.  Hanushek (1986) suggests that such behavior is not surprising
because educational decision-makers may neither have the incentive to operate efficiently
nor the ability to determine the efficient allocation of inputs.  An alternative explanation
is that administrators make conscious choices to misallocate resources because they have
a preference for increased administrative expenditures (Willamson (1963), Dee (1998b)).
Supporters of voucher education often stress the benefits of competition in forcing
schools to reduce unproductive resource allocation.  For example, Dee (1998a) finds that
                                                                                                                                           
2 See Hanushek (1986) and Burtless (1996) for reviews of the literature.3
school districts facing high levels of competition from private schools devote a higher
fraction of resources to instructional spending.
This paper examines the relationship between district expenditure patterns and
student outcomes using data from California.  There are several reasons to focus on the
California.  First, all California school districts are required to make detailed revenue and
expenditure breakdowns publicly available.  Second, the size and number of districts
provide large sample sizes even at the high school level.  Third, subject-specific
standardized tests are required for most students in grades two through eleven providing
consistent performance measures across districts.  Fourth, the Serrano v Priest decisions
and Proposition 13 have effectively rendered revenue per district exogenous allowing us
to focus on the allocation of resources within districts.
The Serrano v Priest rulings of the 1970s resulted in a system that largely
eliminated wealth related differences in spending per student across school districts.
More specifically, the court ruled that unequal property values across school districts
make local property tax an unconstitutional method of funding public schools.  The
decision limited per pupil expenditure differences to an insignificant amount, and further
defined insignificant differences to be those of less than $100.  The underlying system
adopted to conform to the decision remains today and while some differences remain
most districts have wealth related spending differences of less than $100 per student.
The decision does, however, allow for spending differences across school districts
based on categorical needs spending programs that are unrelated to district wealth.  As a
result of these two factors, total per-pupil expenditures continue to vary across California
school districts, but by much less than in other states.  In this sense, California is typical4
of states that have implemented finance reform.  Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998) find
that intra-state funding inequality decreased by 19%-34% in states implementing school
finance reform programs.
In addition to court ordered school finance reform, the implementation of
Proposition 13 in 1979 effectively converted the local property tax system into a
statewide tax system with the state having the authority to allocate property tax revenue
among local governments. The proposition also eliminated the remaining loopholes and
overrides that would have allowed individual districts to spend more money.
3
Proposition 13 also imposes a property tax rate maximum of 1% of market valuation.
According to Sonstelie et al. (2000), the effective rate at the time of Proposition 13 was
close to 2.5%.  The proposition therefore reduced statewide property tax revenue by
57%.
4
California’s experience is not atypical, school finance reform is generally
followed by reductions in expenditures per student and larger classes (Figlio, 1997 and
Sonstelie et al.,2000) with no commensurate drop in administrative spending (Figlio,
1997).  However, Figlio (1997) and Hoxby (1998a) argue that educational reform in
California has been at the extreme end of the national distribution.  Figlio (1997) finds
that the presence of statewide finance reform limiting expenditures is associated with
lower levels of student performance.  In the wake of reform, California schools have
dropped from among the nation’s top performers to among the worst.  Softening the
                                               
3 Voluntary contributions of time and money to increase school expenditures are the sole exception.
Brunner and Sonstelie (1999) provide an interesting discussion and analysis of the impact of such behavior
as a tool to undermine school finance reform in California.
4 For more complete details of Serrano v Priest, Proposition 13 and educational finance reform in
California see Silva and Sonstelie (1995) and Sonstelie et al. (2000).5
picture somewhat, Sonstelie et al. (2000) point out that that some of the performance
decline is the result of demographic and socioeconomic trends in California.
The exogeneity of current school district expenditure levels in California makes it
easier to separate the impact of expenditure level from expenditure allocation.  Stated
somewhat differently, Serrano v Priest and Proposition 13 alleviate concerns about the
potential endogeneity of student quality and inter-district resource disparity and allow us
to focus on consistently estimating the effect of classroom versus non-classroom
spending.  It is important to point out that the equalizing effects of Serrano v Priest and
Proposition 13 on inter-district expenditure levels does not carry-over to intra-district
expenditure allocations.  School districts continue to maintain a great deal of discretion
over intra-district allocation.  They may choose to allocate more resources to teachers,
textbooks, or administrative tasks.  As a result, similar expenditure levels do not
necessarily imply that students receive similar amounts of education.  Interestingly,
54.5% of California voters rejected an initiative limiting the percentage of funds that
school districts could devote to administrative costs on a state-wide ballot in June, 1998.
We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between total
expenditures and student outcomes.  However, this relationship is driven by funds going
directly to instruction.  In contrast to many other studies, our results are robust to
specification and the possible endogeneity of resource allocation, as well as being
consistent across grade levels and subject areas.  More importantly, our estimates suggest
that the relationship between educational spending and student outcomes is not only
statistically significant but also relatively large.  Our instrumental variables estimates
indicate that reallocating $100 from administrative to classroom purposes would increase6
the average district’s mean test score by 0.4-2.7 points and their ranking within the state
by 2.3-7.8 percentiles depending on the subject area and grade level.  This is a
particularly positive finding in light of the fact that it entails no additional resources, only
the reallocation of existing support.
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section II describes the STAR test and
school expenditure data.  Section III describes the empirical approach and results.
Section IV concludes.
II. The Data
 The California Department of Education (CDE) requires each school district to
make detailed revenue and expenditure information publicly available.  The J200 School
Expenditure and Revenue Report provides line item expenditure data for object codes
(teacher salaries, aides salaries, utilities and housekeeping services, etc.) within different
fund codes (General Education, Adult Education, Pupil Transportation, Building, etc.).
We break expenditures into instructional and non-instructional spending.  Instructional
expenditures include teacher’s salaries, teacher’s retirement and other benefits, teacher
aide’s salaries, teacher aide’s retirement and other benefits, librarian’s salaries, librarian’s
retirement and other benefits, textbooks, instructional materials and supplies.  Non-
instructional expenditures include all other expenditures with the exception of capital
expenditures and the other outgo category of expenditures.
5  We include expenditures
from all fund codes except adult education expenditures.
 6  This approach is consistent
with that used by the State to determine per pupil expenditures.  Given our definition,
                                               
5 Including these expenditures does not appreciably affect the results.7
teaching expenditures account for 56.7% of total expenditures at the tenth grade level (all
unified and high school districts) and 59% of total expenditures at the third and sixth
grade level (all unified and elementary school districts).
Notice that teaching expenditures are restricted to items directly related to
classroom instruction.  By design, the instructional category encompasses all fund
categories that impact classroom experience and excludes school and district level
administration.  This is not to imply that basic administrative expenses, construction,
maintenance, or general overhead costs are unnecessary for the provision of education.
California's Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) program was authorized
by Senate Bill (SB) 376 in October 1997.  The statute requires the California State Board
of Education to designate a standardized exam for use by all school districts.  The
Stanford Achievement Test Series, 9
th Edition, Form T (Stanford 9), a multiple-choice
test that allows comparisons to be made to a national sample of students, was chosen.
 7
California school districts are required to test all students in grades two through eleven.
The only exemptions are for special education students and those students whose parent
or guardian submit a written request for exemption.
Students in grades two through eight are tested in reading, mathematics, written
expression, and spelling.  Students in grades nine through eleven are tested in reading,
writing, mathematics, science, and social science. The CDE data excludes districts with
fewer than 10 students writing a specific exam for confidentiality reasons.  Rather than
report ten sets of results, one for each grade, we focus on grades three, six, and ten at
elementary, middle, and high schools respectively.
                                                                                                                                           
6 We have also estimated all models using only the General Education fund code, which accounts for 80%
of the total expenditures from all fund codes, and obtain similar results.8
Both the expenditure data and the STAR exam results are for the 1997-98
academic year.  The sample includes 709 districts at the third grade level, 710 districts at
the sixth grade level, and 374 school districts at the tenth grade level.  Of these 298, 296
and 292 are unified school districts at the third, sixth, and tenth grade levels respectively.
The CDE also provides information regarding several socioeconomic
characteristics of each school district.  These data include the percentage of students with
limited English proficiency, the representation of major ethnic groups, the percentage of
students receiving Aid to Dependent Families with Children (AFDC), and the percentage
of students eligible for free lunch.  Districts are also labeled as urban, suburban, or rural
and either unified or not unified.  Table 1 presents summary statistics by grade level.
III. Empirical Approach and Results
Using a standard production function approach, grade and subject specific student
outcomes are modeled as:
d d d d d PT TE D TS e f d b a + + + + =            (1)
where d denotes district,  TS denotes average test score, D is a vector of district level
socioeconomic characteristics, TE is total per capita expenditures, and PT is the
percentage of per capita expenditures that are devoted to teaching.  District characteristics
include the percentage of limited English proficient students, students from major ethnic
groups, students receiving free lunch and students from households receiving AFDC, as
well as dummy variables identifying districts as urban, suburban or rural.
                                                                                                                                           
7 For more information about the STAR exam see California Department of Education (1998).9
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates for grades three, six, and ten.  The
socioeconomic factors generally have the expected signs and exhibit a similar
relationship with average test scores across grades and subjects.  Districts with greater
percentages of Native American, African American, or Hispanic students have lower
average test scores, while districts with more Asian students have higher average test
scores.  Also as expected, districts with more students who qualify for free lunch
programs and receive AFDC have lower average test scores.  While there is no difference
between urban and suburban average test scores, rural districts do have lower test scores.
Finally, at the third and sixth grade levels districts with more students with limited
English proficiency have lower average test scores among non-limited English
proficiency students.  However, at the tenth grade level districts with more limited
English proficiency students have higher average test scores.  This may result because
districts with a higher proportion of limited English proficient students experience higher
drop-out rates leaving a non-random selection of students at advanced grade levels.
Higher expenditures have a positive and statistically significant impact on average
test scores.  An increase in total expenditures of $100 per student, with constant
instructional versus non-instructional proportions, increases average test scores 0.2-0.3
points depending on grade level and subject.
8  The impact of devoting a greater share of
expenditures to teaching purposes is even more dramatic.  Holding total expenditures
constant, but reallocating $100 to teaching increases the mean test score by 0.3-0.7
points.  Similarly, an $100 increase in total expenditures that is completely directed
towards instructional spending is associated with a 0.3-0.6 point mean test score rise.
                                               
8 The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of class size or computers per student and are therefore not
reported.  Results including these additional variables are available upon request.10
While a 0.3-0.7 point rise on an exam with an average score of 600-650 may seem
small, it is important to remember that district level average test scores generally have a
range of only 80 points.  To put the aforementioned results in context, reallocating $100
from non-teaching to teaching increases the average tenth grade math score by 0.4 points.
This increase moves the average district 3 percentiles higher in the distribution of average
district-level test scores in the state of California.  Most parents, teachers, and
administrators would agree that this is a meaningful increase in a school’s ranking.
Table 3 reports the percentile increase for the mean school associated with an
$100 reallocation towards instructional spending holding total expenditures constant, an
$100 increase in total spending holding the expenditure mix constant, and an $100
increase in spending allocated entirely to the classroom.  To give an example, the average
scoring third grade district will rise by 1.7, 0.8, and 1.5 percentiles in the state average
language test score distribution as a result of an $100 reallocation, holding total
expenditures constant, $100 increase at current proportions, and $100 increase in
teaching expenditures respectively.  The results presented in Table 3 clearly suggest that
while money matters, it is how money is spent that matters most.
One problem with estimating the relationship between expenditures and school
performance is the potentially endogenous relationship between student characteristics
and expenditure decisions.  For example, less able students may require more
administrative assistance.  As a result, some school districts may be forced to devote
more resources to counseling and discipline than others.  However, it is not obvious that
less instructional spending is the optimal solution for less able students.  For example,
Lazear (1999) argues that less able and less well behaved students benefit more from11
smaller classes.  Hence, the optimal response to lower ability, unprepared, or poorly
behaved students may be higher rather than lower instructional expenditures.
For our purposes, the important question is how districts actually respond to
student characteristics.  It is unlikely that school expenditure patterns are randomly
determined.  It is more likely that expenditure choices are related to student body
characteristics and socioeconomic factors, some of which we have measures for and
some of which we do not.  Stated somewhat differently, school expenditure patterns may
be correlated with the error term due to an omitted variable problem.  This reality is
evidenced by the fact that a Hausman (1978) test rejects the exogeneity of expenditure
choices for approximately half of the models estimated by OLS.
To address this issue we re-estimate the model instrumenting for the percentage of
expenditures allocated to instruction using the exogenous components of district
characteristics and revenue.  The detailed accounting of funding sources allows us to
identify the funding/expenditure components that are not at the discretion of school
district administrators, but rather allocated by state or federal governments for specific,
non-transferable purposes.  Exogenous funding components include: transportation,
special education transportation, school improvement, technology assistance, and EESA
math and science.  Home-to-School Transportation is a California program that
reimburses each district for a portion of their transportation costs.  In addition, the Special
Education Transportation program reimburses districts for a portion of the costs incurred
transporting students with disabilities.  The School Improvement Program is a voluntary
statewide program that encourages each district to assess special needs.  Each district
must create a council of administrators, parents and teachers to identify needs and create12
a plan to address these needs.  The State Department of Education reviews the plans and
determines if the plans are suitable for funding.  After initial funding, the plans are
reviewed annually but essentially become an annual entitlement.  Common uses of the
plan include hiring teachers’ aids and creating special academic programs.  The
Educational Technology Assistance program is a similar statewide program that funds
projects that integrate technology into schools and classrooms.  Finally, we also include
district revenues that are obtained from the federal government under the terms of the
1984 Education for Economic Security Act (EESA) that provides funds specifically
targeted for math and science education.
Table 4 reports the estimates for the first stage regressions.  In addition to the
variables listed above, the instrument list also includes district enrollment, district
enrollment squared, and indicator variables for urban/suburban/rural and unified/non-
unified districts.
9
Table 5 presents the second stage results.  The results are similar to the OLS
results.  Both total expenditures and the percentage of expenditures devoted to teaching
are positive and significantly related to test scores for all subject areas and grade levels.
The biggest difference is that the coefficient estimates for the percentage of expenditures
devoted to instruction are three to four times larger than the OLS estimates.  An $100
increase in total expenditures in the current proportions is still associated with a 0.2-0.3
point increase in average test scores depending on the subject while an $100 increase in
instructional spending raises mean test scores by 0.7-1.2 points.
                                               
9 None of the second stage results, reported in Table 5, are significantly effected by the exclusion of any
individual funding or district variables.13
Table 6 replicates Table 3 using the IV estimates.  Reallocating $100 from non-
instructional to instructional purposes is associated upward movement of 5.0, 4.5 and 7.8
percentiles in the state average math test score distributions at the third, sixth, and tenth
grade levels respectively for the average district.  Similarly, a straight $100 increase in
teaching expenditures leads to a 2.5, 2.7 and 5.1 percentile rise in the state average math
test score distributions for the same groups.  In contrast, an $100 increase in expenditures
allocated in current proportions only leads to a 0.1, 0.6 and 1.7 percentile rise in the state
average math test score distributions at the third, sixth, and tenth grade levels respectively
for the average district.  As with the OLS estimates, the results indicate that devoting
more money to instructional purposes has a positive impact on student performance.
Thus far we have focussed on the contemporaneous relationship between
educational inputs and student outcomes.  However, current test scores are clearly a
function of both current educational experiences as well as past school environments.
The usual solution is to include past test scores on the right-hand side to capture the
relationship between current achievement and past achievement.  While we do not have
individual test scores over time, we do have the scores for the previous grade which can
be used to construct a ‘quasi-gain score’ model.  This approach is reasonable since the
distribution of families by socioeconomic class is relatively constant from year to year
and revenue is similar between single years (Ferguson and Ladd, 1996).
Table 7 provides the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the total
expenditures and percentage of resources devoted to teaching variables from these
regressions.  Not surprisingly, the previous grade’s test score is positive and significantly
related the year-ahead test scores.  However, expenditures per student and the percentage14
of expenditures devoted to teaching continue to be positively related to test scores.  Total
expenditures remain statistically significant in nine of the thirteen OLS regressions. The
percentage of resources allocated to instruction remains significant in eight of the thirteen
OLS equations.  Using instrumental variables with a model that includes the previous
grade’s scores has little effect on the original results.  In all cases total expenditures and
percentage teaching have the same signs.  Total expenditures remains statistically
significant for all but the sixth grade math and language score equations.  The percentage
of resources devoted to teaching is significant in all specifications.  Overall, the results
are robust to the inclusion of the proxy for gain scores.
IV. Conclusion
The results presented in this paper suggest that increased educational expenditures
only matter if they make it to the classroom.  Increased instructional expenditures have a
positive effect on performance while higher non-teaching expenditures may actually be
detrimental.  Combined with the existing literature on administrative spending, the results
presented in this paper suggest that policy makers should not only be concerned with the
level of resources but also the allocation of resources.  In addition, these results indicate
that while school finance reform may successfully increase equality across districts in
terms of total expenditures, it does not guarantee that funds will be equally devoted to
teaching.  Funding equalization across districts may therefore result in less convergence
in performance than policy makers anticipate.
At first glance the public policy implications seem clear; school districts need to
devote fewer resources to administration and any increase in educational expenditures15
should be targeted directly at the classroom.  However, these policies may be more
difficult to implement in practice.  For example, even if the recently defeated proposal in
California to limit administrative expenses at the district level to 5% of total expenditures
had passed, districts could have reached this goal by simply moving centralized district
administrative functions back to the individual schools.  More generally, limiting total
administrative costs, at the district and school level, would likely prompt administrators
to hide administrative-spending under the teaching-umbrella.
It might also seem that the easiest way to decrease the percentage of spending
devoted to administrative tasks is to exploit administrative economies of scale.  This
objective could be achieved by consolidating school districts and increasing school size.
However, increasing district and school size may have other offsetting effects on
performance.  For example, in Bedard, Brown, and Helland (1999) we find that larger
schools generally perform worse than smaller schools.
It is equally difficult to ensure that increased spending targeted broadly for the
classroom would go to the desired use.  In order to ensure increased teaching
expenditures, policy makers may be forced to narrowly target funding for specific
purposes.  Recent California class size reduction initiatives are a good example of
attempts to ensure that funds reach the classroom.  However, the existing literature
concerning class size effects is ambiguous at best; both Hoxby (1998b) and Lazear
(1999) argue that the optimal allocation of resources varies across student characteristics.
While the results presented in this paper clearly suggest that greater classroom
funding is beneficial, it is less clear how to redirect current and/or future funding in that
direction. The results in both Lazear (1999) and Hoxby (1998b) certainly suggest that it is16
difficult to construct effective narrowly targeted funding systems.  As such, there is a
clear need for further thought into the design of school funding allocation mechanisms.17
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Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Test Scores
Math  695.1 13.0 659.5 19.4 593.6 20.1
Reading  691.6 14.2 660.2 17.6 605.7 23.1
Language  670.4 14.3 646.1 16.1 599.8 19.9
Social Science  654.4 9.9 na na na na
Science  679.0 11.1 na na na na
Spelling  na na 645.5 17.8 591.5 16.7
District Chracteristics
Limited English proficiency 16.3% 14.3% 18.2% 17.7% 18.3% 17.7%
Native American 1.7% 4.2% 1.4% 3.7% 1.4% 3.7%
Asian 5.8% 8.5% 5.0% 7.9% 5.0% 7.9%
Pacific Islander 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5% 0.9%
Hispanic 33.4% 24.2% 33.8% 26.2% 33.9% 26.2%
African American 5.2% 8.2% 4.3% 7.4% 4.3% 7.4%
White 51.7% 25.3% 53.6% 27.5% 53.5% 27.5%
Students Receiving AFDC 13.8% 10.7% 14.4% 11.6% 14.5% 11.6%
Students Receiving Free Lunch 39.0% 22.2% 45.3% 25.9% 45.5% 25.9%
Rural District 0.492 0.501 0.544 0.498 0.546 0.498
Urban District 0.160 0.367 0.121 0.327 0.121 0.327
Suburban District 0.348 0.477 0.335 0.472 0.333 0.472
Unified School District 0.781 0.414 0.417 0.493 0.420 0.494
District Enrollment 11688 37204 7068 27460 7064 27479
Per Student Expenditures and Revenues
Total Expenditures  $5,555 $908 $5,386 $904 $5,403 $928
Teaching Expenditures as Percentage of Total 56.7% 4.1% 59.0% 4.9% 59.0% 5.0%
Federal  EESA/Math & Science Revenues  $4 $6 $5 $31 $5 $31
State Educational Technology Assistance Revenues $12 $19 $12 $24 $12 $28
State  Home to School Transportation Revenues  $142 $154 $208 $217 $213 $251
State  Special Education Revenues  $245 $147 $223 $137 $225 $141
State  School Improvement Revenues  $48 $34 $68 $48 $68 $45
* There are only 373 observations for the Language Scores Variable.
** There are only 707 and 709 observations for the Reading and Language Scores Variables.
*** There are only 708 observations for the Reading and Spelling Scores Variables.
Grade 10 (n=374*) Grade 6 (n=710**) Grade 3 (n=709***)
Table 1: Summary Statistics21
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold coefficients significant at the 10% level.
Independent
Variable Math Lang. Read. Science SocScieMath Lang. Read. Spell. Math Lang. Read. Spell.
Intercept 688.2 671.8 698.0 674.6 647.0 649.9 643.5 660.4 642.8 588.9 593.9 605.0 589.9
(7.42) (7.99) (7.23) (6.07) (5.87) (7.78) (6.01) (5.62) (6.34) (8.97) (7.19) (7.13) (6.71)
% Limited 9.819 7.757 3.148 6.331 6.189 -5.545 -4.359 -7.260 -9.606 0.407 -1.939 -4.809 -15.671
English Prof. (4.51) (4.82) (4.40) (3.69) (3.57) (4.49) (3.48) (3.26) (3.66) (5.20) (4.16) (4.13) (3.88)
% Native -39.82 -46.34 -42.74 -39.58 -30.37 -40.52 -27.39 -37.49 -24.30 -38.38 -40.24 -40.98 -24.68
American (8.82) (9.42) (8.59) (7.22) (6.98) (11.7) (9.04) (8.41) (9.53) (13.4) (10.7) (10.6) (10.0)
% Asian 43.70 20.72 3.05 8.562 7.281 34.86 17.56 7.710 36.82 24.26 20.35 4.93 47.80
(4.62) (4.94) (4.51) (3.79) (3.66) (5.86) (4.52) (4.23) (4.77) (6.78) (5.43) (5.38) (5.07)
% Pacific -205.9 -165.6 -173.8 -129.1 -180.4 -108.9 -82.59 -67.74 -24.28 -82.10 -41.94 -59.62 43.87
Islander (55.9) (62.6) (54.4) (45.7) (44.2) (44.6) (34.4) (32.1) (36.3) (52.7) (42.2) (41.8) (39.4)
% Hispanic -23.47 -31.84 -35.29 -26.77 -23.23 -14.32 -11.07 -20.89 -11.35 -15.60 -19.79 -28.56 -8.110
(2.81) (3.00) (2.73) (2.30) (2.22) (3.63) (2.81) (2.63) (2.96) (4.20) (3.36) (3.34) (3.14)
% African -26.42 -30.44 -33.05 -27.45 -18.83 -38.82 -21.80 -29.89 -21.76 -18.15 -18.36 -30.51 -6.4015
American (5.15) (5.50) (5.02) (4.22) (4.07) (6.54) (5.06) (4.71) (5.33) (7.59) (6.07) (6.02) (5.67)
% of Students -16.30 -13.54 -11.95 -9.387 -8.913 -21.91 -17.03 -14.62 -17.35 -20.48 -23.06 -14.83 -18.03
AFDC (4.01) (4.28) (3.91) (3.28) (3.17) (5.26) (4.10) (3.84) (4.28) (6.07) (4.86) (4.81) (4.54)
% of Students -18.02 -20.53 -18.69 -15.85 -13.89 -34.54 -32.53 -32.09 -34.63 -38.30 -37.40 -45.97 -27.96
with Free Lunch (2.75) (2.93) (2.68) (2.25) (2.17) (3.57) (2.75) (2.59) (2.91) (4.15) (3.33) (3.29) (3.11)
Rural School -3.844 -4.761 -4.024 -1.832 -2.076 -3.857 -3.769 -2.964 -3.557 -3.408 -4.351 -3.169 -2.752
(0.89) (0.96) (0.87) (0.73) (0.71) (1.04) (0.80) (0.75) (0.85) (1.21) (0.97) (0.96) (0.90)
Urban School -0.555 0.362 -0.352 -0.558 -0.867 0.771 0.696 0.551 0.734 -1.312 -0.771 -0.269 -0.809
(1.07) (1.15) (1.05) (0.88) (0.85) (1.37) (1.05) (0.98) (1.11) (1.58) (1.27) (1.25) (1.18)
Expend per 2.128 1.772 1.656 1.901 1.954 2.592 1.55 2.068 1.787 2.585 2.643 2.838 1.781
Student ($1000) (0.45) (0.49) (0.44) (0.37) (0.36) (0.52) (0.40) (0.37) (0.42) (0.59) (0.47) (0.47) (0.44)
% Teaching 0.231 0.217 0.174 0.221 0.232 0.395 0.319 0.287 0.309 0.319 0.374 0.384 0.214
Expenditures (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
R-Square 0.7766 0.7923 0.8228 0.7965 0.7599 0.7229 0.76 0.825 0.781 0.654 0.774 0.835 0.7215
Observations 374 373 374 374 374 710 709 707 710 709 709 708 708
Table 2: OLS Estimates of Performance Equations
Dependent Variable: Subject Test Scores
Grade 10 Grade 6 Grade322
Notes: All percentile changes are evaluated at the appropriate mean.
$100 Reallocation from Instructional $100 Increase Spent $100 Increase in
to Instructional Spending In Current Proportions  Teaching Expenditures
Grade 10
Math 2.7 1.7 2.5
Language 1.6 0.8 1.1
Reading 1.1 0.8 1.1
Science 1.8 1.0 1.8
Social Science 1.0 0.8 1.0
Grade 6
Math 1.5 0.6 1.4
Language 1.0 0.2 0.7
Reading 1.3 0.5 1.2
Spelling 1.6 0.2 1.0
Grade 3
Math 1.1 0.1 0.8
Language 1.7 0.8 1.5
Reading 0.4 0.2 0.3
Spelling 0.8 0.3 0.8
Table 3: OLS Predicted Percentile Changes from $100 Changes in Per Pupil Expenditures23
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold coefficients significant at the 10% level. The first stage
estimates are the same for the other subjectwith the same number of observations and very similar for those
subjects with fewer observations.
Grade 10 Grade 6 Grade 3
Independent Variable % Teaching % Teaching % Teaching
Intercept 0.558726 0.630305 0.629883
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Rural District -0.000602 0.002905 0.000000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban District -0.011950 -0.005027 -0.005177
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
District Enrollment -0.000104 -0.000250 -0.000219
(1000s of students) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
District Enrollment*District Enrollment 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
(1000s of students) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unified District 0.037888 -0.035527 -0.035247
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Federal  EESA/Math & Science  -0.636000 -0.062818 -0.061772
Revenues per Student ($1000s) (0.327) (0.055) (0.055)
State Educational Technology Assistance  0.039027 0.101000 0.114000
Revenues per Student ($1000s) (0.097) (0.070) (0.064)
State Home to School Transportation -0.089435 -0.088788 -0.076706
Revenues per Student ($1000s) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008)
State Special Education Transportation -0.028374 -0.011406 -0.014351
Revenues per Student ($1000s) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
State  School Improvement  0.048402 -0.064336 -0.065178
Revenues per Student ($1000s) (0.066) (0.036) (0.039)
Observations 374 710 709
R-Square 0.2693 0.2045 0.2194
Table 4: First Stage Estimates for Math Scores24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold coefficients significant at the 10% level.
Independent
Variable Math Lang. Read. Scie. Soc. Scie.Math Lang. Read. Spell. Math Lang. Read. Spell.
Intercept 646.8 614.0 643.9 641.6 608.8 607.9 597.8 621.5 595.3 534.3 544.5 541.2 564.2
(14.0) (15.5) (14.3) (11.5) (11.4) (13.5) (10.8) (10.1) (11.4) (15.2) (12.5) (13.1) (11.0)
% Limited 7.102 3.711 -0.443 4.182 3.695 -7.431 -6.139 -9.075 -11.78 -1.680 -3.747 -7.258 -16.60
English Prof. (5.01) (5.62) (5.13) (4.10) (4.09) (4.81) (3.88) (3.60) (4.08) (5.57) (4.57) (4.74) (4.02)
% Native -32.82 -36.50 -34.59 -33.71 -23.77 -34.99 -21.08 -32.89 -19.08 -34.65 -36.35 -36.41 -22.52
American (9.84) (11.1) (10.1) (8.05) (8.04) (12.5) (10.1) (9.26) (10.6) (14.4) (11.8) (12.2) (10.4)
% Asian 43.01 19.86 2.492 7.912 6.595 32.67 16.35 6.198 35.11 22.53 18.29 2.948 46.62
(5.07) (5.68) (5.19) (4.15) (4.14) (6.22) (5.01) (4.62) (5.28) (7.22) (5.92) (6.13) (5.20)
% Pacific -188.3 -164.5 -153.5 -114.4 -163.8 -109.7 -82.40 -67.11 -23.58 -87.12 -47.44 -66.37 40.94
Islander (61.5) (72.1) (63.0) (50.3) (50.3) (47.6) (38.3) (35.2) (40.3) (56.4) (46.2) (47.9) (40.6)
% Hispanic -20.82 -28.02 -31.50 -24.77 -20.85 -13.46 -9.966 -19.98 -10.11 -14.65 -19.16 -27.42 -7.811
(3.14) (3.50) (3.22) (2.57) (2.56) (3.88) (3.12) (2.88) (3.29) (4.48) (3.67) (3.81) (3.23)
% African -30.18 -34.10 -36.28 -30.93 -22.54 -41.54 -23.68 -31.68 -23.56 -19.93 -20.81 -32.71 -7.864
American (5.51) (6.18) (5.65) (4.51) (4.50) (6.90) (5.56) (5.11) (5.85) (8.00) (6.56) (6.80) (5.77)
% of Students -13.02 -9.020 -8.086 -6.645 -5.823 -19.88 -15.46 -13.25 -15.71 -18.64 -20.96 -12.59 -16.82
AFDC (4.48) (5.03) (4.59) (3.67) (3.66) (5.59) (4.54) (4.20) (4.74) (6.46) (5.30) (5.49) (4.67)
% of Students -21.65 -25.31 -23.21 -18.80 -17.27 -36.58 -34.14 -33.58 -36.44 -39.99 -39.22 -48.01 -28.99
with Free Lunch (3.17) (3.54) (3.25) (2.60) (2.59) (3.80) (3.06) (2.84) (3.22) (4.43) (3.64) (3.77) (3.20)
Rural School -2.817 -3.482 -2.721 -1.003 -1.124 -3.105 -2.996 -2.299 -2.718 -2.392 -3.422 -2.012 -2.264
(1.02) (1.14) (1.05) (0.84) (0.83) (1.13) (0.91) (0.84) (0.96) (1.31) (1.08) (1.11) (0.95)
Urban School 1.100 2.457 1.562 0.832 0.693 1.914 1.705 1.493 1.825 -0.127 0.425 1.134 -0.161
(1.25) (1.39) (1.28) (1.02) (1.02) (1.47) (1.18) (1.09) (1.24) (1.70) (1.39) (1.45) (1.23)
Expend per 2.395 2.293 2.179 2.062 2.173 2.442 1.597 2.064 1.855 2.833 2.725 3.089 1.797
Student ($1000) (0.46) (0.53) (0.48) (0.38) (0.38) (0.51) (0.41) (0.38) (0.43) (0.58) (0.48) (0.50) (0.42)
% Teaching 0.933 1.181 1.071 0.786 0.881 1.125 1.087 0.948 1.109 1.221 1.206 1.443 0.650
Expenditures (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
R-Square 0.7448 0.7454 0.7796 0.766 0.7149 0.6981 0.722 0.798 0.745 0.627 0.744 0.796 0.71
Observations 374 373 374 374 374 710 709 707 710 709 709 708 708
Table 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Performance Equations
Dependent Variable: Subject Test Scores
Grade 10 Grade 6 Grade325
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level.
$100 Reallocation from Instructional $100 Increase Spent $100 Increase in
to Instructional Spending In Current Proportions  Teaching Expenditures
Grade 10
Math 7.8 1.7 5.1
Language 5.6 1.0 3.2
Reading 3.0 1.1 1.8
Science 4.8 1.0 3.0
Social Science 5.9 0.8 3.2
Grade 6
Math 4.5 0.6 2.7
Language 4.9 0.2 1.7
Reading 4.7 0.5 2.2
Spelling 2.6 0.2 2.0
Grade 3
Math 5.0 0.1 2.5
Language 6.0 0.8 2.2
Reading 2.3 0.2 0.8
Spelling 3.4 0.3 1.8
Table 6: IV Predicted Percentile Changes from a $100 Changes in Per Pupil Expenditures